![]() ![]() “For example, does 75 percent of a full deflection count as a completed check, or is 65 percent OK? Rather than try to artificially set a limit, we elected to use full deflection as we could not know if a movement less than a full check was as a result of intentional crew action to move the surface, or was an inadvertent movement.” Further, many OEMs specify that a flight control check is over the full range of motion, he added. The team chose “stop to stop” as its measure of full deflection “to eliminate any judgment by the industry in determining what a full check is/was,” noted Mark Larsen, senior manager of safety and flight operations for NBAA. A valid flight-control check was defined in the report as “full-deflection control surface movement in each direction (i.e. Further, there was no flight control check conducted on 2,923 flights, or 2 percent. The report revealed that 16 percent of those flights took off with only a partial check of flight controls, meaning that not all control surfaces were found to be checked. The team gathered and analyzed de-identified data from business aviation FOQA programs, releasing its findings in a report titled “Business Aviation Compliance with Manufacturer-Required Flight Control Checks Before Takeoff.” The data covers 143,756 business aviation flights between Jan. NBAA subsequently assembled a team comprising business aviation Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) groups and associated vendors, NBAA staff, NBAA Safety Committee members and other safety experts to study compliance within the business aviation industry. The NTSB investigation further revealed that the flight crew failed to complete flight control checks on 98 percent of the previous 175 takeoffs in the aircraft involved in the accident.Īs a result of the findings, the NTSB recommended that NBAA work with industry on a study of the extent of non-compliance with pre-takeoff flight checks. The aircraft crashed on takeoff and all seven aboard died in the accident. ![]() In the 2014 Hanscom Field accident, the NTSB found that the crew did not perform a flight-control check before takeoff, leaving it unaware that the gust lock was engaged. “It is equally disturbing that the data highlights a lack of professional discipline among some crews in not accomplishing manufacturer-directed checklists-particularly items critical to safety of flight.” “The tragic GIV accident at Bedford, Mass., on May 31, 2014, provided ample stimulus to probe more deeply into business aviation procedural non-compliance,” NBAA said in the safety report released in September. The 2014 fatal crash of a Gulfstream IV at Hanscom Field in Bedford, Mass., and a subsequent NBAA report finding an 18-percent non-compliance rate with manufacturer-required pre-takeoff flight-control checks are warnings that the business aviation industry needs to focus on leadership and professionalism, industry experts say.
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